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"So Extraordinary, So Unprecedented an Authority"':
A Conceptual Reconsideration of the Singular
Doctrine of Judicial Review
Anthony V Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF "JUDICIAL REVIEW"
Of all the different engines of government spawned by the
Founders and developed in the nation over the ensuing centuries,
the institution of the United States Supreme Court is arguably
America's most intriguing. While the Federal Legislature labors
along routinely and the work of the chief executive shifts
inexorably toward the center of the public eye, the Supreme Court
continues along its shadowy, cabalistic way. Now, at the
deconstructionist end of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
steadfastly resists deconstruction: its method remains mystery, its
demeanor Delphic.2 Given this nation's almost mystical fascination
with the "Founding Fathers," behind the veil as it were, the Court's
function remains ostensibly oracular.' Even as the styles of the
* Associate Professor, Legal and Constitutional History, Campbell University School of
Law; LL.M., University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1998; J.D., University of North Carolina -
Chapel Hill, 1981; A.B., Duke University, 1977. I wish to acknowledge the gracious
contributions of now Dean and St. Thomas More Professor of Law, Catholic University
School of Law, then Caruso Family Chair Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of
Law and mentor Douglas Kmiec, in the development of this project.
1. A phrase employed by an Anti-Federalist editorialist under the nom de plume
"Centinel," in an editorial originating in the PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETrEER, Feb. 26,
1788 (Centinel XVI), reacting to a presumed power of "constitutional review" in the proposed
Supreme Court. Contemporaries attributed the Centinel essays to the then Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice George Bryan, though historians have come to settle on his eldest
son, Samuel (1759-1821), as the more likely author.
2. A term employed during the Depression to good effect by Thurman Arnold, then
describing the Supreme Court as something akin to a "great Delphic oracle." THURMAN
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOIS OF GOVERNMENT 117 (1935). Writing around the same time, Max Lerner
similarly described the role acceded to by the Supreme Court for the American nation,
characterizing its Justices as "Platonic guardians that watched over the mythical Greek
republic." Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbol, 46 YALE LJ. 1290, 1308 (1937).
Little has changed in the intervening seventy years.
3. Professor John Attanasio offered without apology the analogy of "priest" for the
American Supreme Court Justices, developing the parallels between "priest" and "judge" in
Everyman's Constitutional Law: A Theory of the Power of Judicial Review, 72 GEo. J.
1665, 1701 (1984). Robert McCloskey described the Court's actions, in some segments of the
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Legislature and, more and more, the Executive seem inevitably
plodding, pedestrian and earth bound, the Supreme Court continues
its rare, vital work, for all intents and purposes, in the clouds.4
Post-modern musings and jurisprudential "realism"
notwithstanding, few Americans would deny an inevitable
association between the institution of the Supreme Court and the
notion of "power," in some reasonable understanding of the term.
Taking the work of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott5 decision
as an example, and considering particularly the place of that
decision in American political and cultural history, many historians
have been moved to examine the possible catalytic effect of that
decision upon the ensuing events leading to the commencement of
the Civil War.6 Further, a search for the roots of the civil rights
struggle of America's dispossessed peoples across the pages of its
history invariably implicates the Supreme Court at every turn.
Whether involving Native America,7 African-origin America,8 or
feminist America,9 the Supreme Court has been in the middle of the
developing struggle for political personhood in its various forms.
watching public's mind, as "its mythic business of consulting the oracle." ROBERT McCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 27 (1960).
4. Carl Brent Swisher noted that the singular place of the Constitution in the symbolic
mind of the American polity of 1857 "derived from a judgment higher than the minds of
men." Carl Brent Swisher, Dred Scott One Hundred Years After, 19 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS
165, 168 (1957). Professor Swisher is clear about the effect of such a view on the polity's
image of that Constitution's keeper, the Supreme Court: "The Supreme Court, in other words,
when it spoke in terms of the Constitution, spoke also with the overtures of deity." Id. Again,
little has changed today.
5. Formally, Dred Scott v. John FA. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857).
6. The list of scholars acknowledging a Dred Scott/Civil War link reads like a "Who's
Who" of antebellum-era legal and socio-political historians, including DON E. FERRENBACHER,
THE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978) (canvassing "the
belief that [Dred Scott] . . . became a major causal link between the general forces of
national disruption and the final crisis of Union in 1860-61."); ROBERT K CARR, THE SUPREME
COURT AND JUDICIAL REvIEw (1942) (Carr plainly referenced Dred Scott as "[the] case . . .
which helped to bring about the Civil War."); and GEORGE FORT MILTON, THE EVE OF CONFLICT:
STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS AND THE NEEDLESS WAR (1963) (the author specifically included the case
among "perhaps six incidents, mere smudges on the face of history" in the absence of which
there "might have been no Civil War."). Milton names as the other "smudges", Uncle Tom's
Cabin, Bleeding Kansas, Bully Brooks' assault on Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner,
President Buchanan's hate for Stephen Douglas, and Harper's Ferry. Id. While the list of
historians echoing these sentiments is immense, the reader should nevertheless remember
that the Dred Scott/Civil War nexus remains labyrinthine in complexity.
7. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheaton) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Petus) 1 (1831); and Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1876); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wallace) 162 (1874); Bradweli v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wallace) 130 (1873); and In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
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Within the American context, then, given the Supreme Court's
status as the "appointed guardian of the Constitution,"10 it is all but
pollyannaish to characterize the words of that singular institution
as anything other than words of immense power.1
If the reality of the power behind the Supreme Court's words is
all but undeniable, the source of that great power is equally certain:
judicial review. Simply stated, given the "supremacy" of the
Constitution in American government and life, 2 the voice that
interprets its precepts for a waiting, captive nation is a voice
necessarily imbued with singular power derived from association
with the document itself. Professor Alexander Bickel underscored
the point well when he noted, "The power which distinguishes the
Supreme Court of the United States is that of constitutional review
of actions of the other branches of government, federal and state."
13
A not-yet-Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter was only mildly guilty of
hyperbole, in the American context, when he baldly stated in 1930,
"In good truth, the Supreme Court is the Constitution." 4 Given the
general American reverence for the Constitution, a reverence
presenting itself in a form very much like worship, 5 the power
10. SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1862).
11. Alexander Bickel unashamedly referred to it as "the most extraordinarily powerful
court of law the world has ever known." ALEXANDER BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH.
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLMCS 1 (1962). Robert McCloskey echoed the sentiment
in strikingly similar terms, describing the Supreme Court as "the most powerful court known
to history." McCLOsKEY, supra note 3, at 225. No less an historical personage than Alexis de
Tocqueville intimated as much as well, noting:
When we have examined in detail the organization of the Supreme Court and the
entire prerogatives which it exercises, we shall readily admit that a more imposing
judicial power was never constituted by any people. The Supreme Court is placed
higher than any other known tribunal, both by the nature of its rights and the class of
justiciable parties which it controls.
ALEXIS DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1968). Interestingly,
de Tocqueville went on to couch the potential influence of the Supreme Court in terms of
the other competitive branches of government, noting accurately, if alarmingly:
The President, who exercises a limited power, may err without causing great mischief
in the state. Congress may decide amiss without destroying the Union, because the
electoral body in which the Congress originates may cause it to retract its decision by
changing its members. But if the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent or
bad men, the Union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war.
Id. at 152. Given the way events unfolded historically after Dred Scott, the insightful French
diplomat's words must be seen as tinged with prophecy. Though written in 1835, his
comments remain no less vital today.
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
13. See BICKE, supra note 11.
14. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 8 (1986) (emphasis in the original).
15. The document has been publicly described by two different American notables of
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inuring to the "final arbiter of constitutional questions" 6 is quite
palpable.
But this condition is not without attendant problems. Simply put,
"[t]he greater the authority of the writers [of Supreme Court
opinions], the more dangerous are their errors." 17 Apart from
honest human errors, there is the more sinister danger of the Court
deliberately listing toward mundane, partisan politics, and taking
the Constitution captive along the way. Professor Bruce Ackerman
put the matter succinctly in an immensely thoughtful treatment of
Federalist 78 (among other things): "The problem with a Supreme
Court, however, is obvious enough. What prevents it from misusing
its constitutional authority to further one or another factional
interest rather than to interpret the meaning 'of the past
constitutional achievements of the American People?"'8 Whether by
mistake or by chicanery, the matter is the same - there remains a
pressing need for an effective means of monitoring the deployment
of so pristine a power as that managed by the Supreme Court
under the American constitutional framework.
A fortiori, this concern raises a critical question - is there an
effective means of "reviewing" the Supreme Court's judicial review?
Indeed, American history has not lacked for intense, bitter
two different eras - then Congressman Caleb Cushing in 1834, and Chief Justice William
Howard Taft in 1922 - in the same reverent manner as America's "Ark of Covenant." Id. at
xviii. Academic commentators who have noted the tendency of Americans to worship both
the Constitution and constitutional institutions are legion.
16. These are the words of Daniel Webster, describing the "special privilege" of the
judiciary, in his own arguments before the Supreme Court in Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 420 (1837). STANLEY 1. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION:
THE CHARLEs RIVER BRIDGE CASE 45 (1971).
17. T. Farrar, The Dred Scott Case, 85 THE NORTH AMERIcAN REVIEW 392, 393 (1857). See
also, in the same regard, DE TocQuEvILLE, supra note 11. And, as Louis B. Boudin caustically
suggested in 1932, the effects of such an error may not be limited to the offending case
alone:
It is one of the essential weaknesses of Government by Judiciary that, as in all
theocratic governments, based upon the sole power to expound a sacred text, its
priests cannot afford to admit error without undermining the power of the priesthood
and upsetting the form of government in which they are the ruling caste. Error must
therefore be perpetuated, no matter what the consequences.
Louis B. BouDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 287-288 (1932).
18. Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ.
1013, 1030 (1984). Almost a century earlier Sidney Fisher anticipated the effect following
from a negative answer to Professor Ackerman's rhetorical question, when he averred that:
It would no longer be a judiciary but a party organ. It would represent not stability,
but instability, and become, not a judge, but an advocate .... They would lose the
confidence of the people, and when that is lost, reverence for the law and security for
all right will soon be lost with it.
See FISHER, supra note 10, at 73.
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controversy over the Court's arguably erroneous or political misuse
of the created power of judicial review.' 9 However, that controversy
has inevitably presented itself in inflammatory political language,
fueled by the party in the debate most politically inconvenienced
by the allegedly partisan Court action. Through the imprecise
appellation "judicial legislation" (or the more colorful "super
legislature"), the Court is effectively accused, by both the Right and
the Left, of illegally melding a legislative function to its limited
judicial power and of favoring particular sides in the final
settlements of judicial questions. Pressed in such partisan terms,
criticisms of the Court are too easily dismissed as nothing more
than the political "sour grapes" of the losing party; the vital issue of
the Court's potentially ultra vires constitutional actions remains
unanswered, and indeed unexplored.
The significance of this observation should not be easily passed
over. After all, the Supreme Court is one of three co-equal branches
of government in the unique and unprecedented American
constitutional plan. The peculiarly powerful agent of judicial
review, engrafted onto the Court as early as 1803,20 demands
orthodoxy from the Court and, consequently, a careful, principled
monitoring of all its activities. Questions of the functional
metaphysics of the nature of its power, counter-majoritarian or
counter-countermajoritarian, are of legitimate interest to academics
and other students of the institution. However, they pale in
comparison to the need for a precise means of reviewing the
mediation of its immense influence. The preferred, convenient
charge of "judicial legislation," with its particular political
vulnerability, simply does not pass muster; something much more
precise and effective is needed.
This, then, is the goal of this study - to suggest a new language
of review in formulating a workable means of testing the
constitutional orthodoxy of separate actions of the Supreme Court,
language grounded in function rather than policy. The effort will
necessarily begin with the development of an adequate American
jurisprudence underlying the doctrine of judicial review,
considering both relevant seventeenth and eighteenth century
intellectual thought and notions of the doctrine existing in
19. As Robert McCloskey put it: "American constitutional history has been in large part
a spasmodic running debate over the behavior of the Supreme Court." KAMMEN, supra note
14, at 9.
20. This is seen through the actions of Chief Justice John Marshall in the hallmark case
of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 7 (1803).
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pre-Constitution America. Thereafter, attention will be redirected to
the contentions surrounding the proposed function of the Supreme
Court as it developed in the intellectually vital Federalist/
Anti-Federalist debate prior to the ratification of the Constitution in
1788, with a particular focus on Alexander Hamilton's imposing
Federalist 7821 and its antithetical philosophical counterpart,
Brutus XV.22 Next, attention will be paid to the words chosen by
Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall in framing "judicial review" in
Marbury v. Madison, and the differing interpretations to which the
words are arguably susceptible. From those words a test of
constitutional orthodoxy will be suggested, pertinent to the work of
the Supreme Court generally, and illustrated by application to two
historically significant cases: Dred Scott, and its striking ideological
twin, Roe v. Wade.
23
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN PRE-CONSTITUTION AMERICA
Scholars are by no means incorrect when they place the
beginning of what might be called the modem notions of judicial
review some time soon after the Civil War.24 Certainly the Supreme
Court's antebellum reference to that power in annulling actions of
state governments was rare, and, with regard to federal statute
annulment, all but non-existent. 25 However, it appears equally
beyond argument that the rudimentary beginnings of a
jurisprudence of judicial review are replete throughout
Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary America. Certainly the
Enlightenment foundation from which the nation effectively sprang
would not have been resistant to the notion, and evidence of some
sort of constitutional review philosophy is implicit, if not obvious,
in the thoughts of the patriots, the words of the Founders and the
actions of the states. A reasonably clear understanding of these
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
22. This essay was originally published in the NEW YORK JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 1788.
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. Alfred Kelly and Winfred Harbison stated: "The modem conception of judicial
review began to make its appearance [during the Reconstruction Era]." 2 ALFRED KELLY &
WINFRED HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEvELOPMENT 481 (1948). Their
position on the matter is by no means unorthodox among scholars.
25. Professor Benjamin F Wright put the number of antebellum Supreme Court cases
specifically overturning state legislation at 60. BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTONAL LAW 77 (1942). The number of cases in which a federal act was overturned by
the Supreme Court prior to the Civil War is fixed at exactly one - the infamous Dred Scott
decision. It is ironic (though perhaps not anomalous) that the first negative of an act of
Congress after the power was defined by the Court in Marbury is so intimately connected
with the most precipitous event in American history.
734 Vol. 39:729
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"roots" is a necessary and useful first step in underscoring the
importance of an adequate vehicle for managing this unique
American political power.
A. Constitutional Review - An Enlightenment Jurisprudence6
As with much of what comes to be celebrated as uniquely
American, judicial review traces its roots back to the thoughts,
laws and customs of England. Though American-style judicial
review has simply never been a central tenet of British
constitutional jurisprudence, that nation preferring the unparalleled
supremacy of its Parliament,27 its roots can nevertheless be traced
to Great Britain, and that nation's pre-eminent seventeenth century
authority on the common law, Sir Edward Coke. First, in his
famous Institutes,28 Coke contended for something much like the
supremacy of law, postulating that Magna Charta and the common
law were paramount, governing both the British Crown and
Parliament itself.29 Further refinement might be found in his
opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case (1610), where then King's Bench
Chief Justice Coke viewed an act of Parliament authorizing
licensing of physicians by the London College of Physicians to be
void, as countering common law.30 While Coke's novel suggestions
were out of favor in England by the turn of the eighteenth
century,3 1 they remained of wide interest across the ocean in
America, for political reasons related to revolution.
Those "political reasons" might be more precisely described as
colonial America's increasing fascination with notions of limited
26. This subtitle might suggest a general review of the works of Western Enlightenment
philosophers, most notably those of France and England. However, as British philosopher
John Locke provides an adequate backdrop for the rather simple points the author desires to
make here, a thorough review of the doctrine of judicial review against the breadth of
Enlightenment thought will not be attempted, as it is not necessary here.
27. This is true at least after 1689, and as a direct result of the conclusion of the
"Glorious Revolution" and the orchestrated ascendancy of William and Mary of Orange to the
forever compromised English throne.
28. Sm EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1628).
29. See KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 24, at 46.
30. VIII CoKE's REPORmS 118 (1610).
31. Indeed, they came to be entirely superceded on this point by the principle laid
down by Lord Blackstone thereafter, that:
[T]he power and jurisdiction of Parliament... is so transcendent and absolute that it
cannot be confined . . . within any bounds . . . [tlhis being the place where that
absolute despotic power which must in all governments reside some where, is
intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.
Sm WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 145 (Callaghan and
Company, 4th ed. 1899).
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government, most articulately distilled and presented by English
jurisprude John Locke in his substantial Two Treatises of
Government.a2 Published together in 1689, though written and
circulated as early as 1680-81, they were not conceived as erudite
pieces of pure jurisprudential thought, but rather as political
polemics, intellectually favoring the supremacy of Parliament in
British government and counter pointing Sir Robert Filmer's
Patriarcha, which sought to locate supremacy solely in the Crown.
In his First Treatise, in which "The False Principles and
Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and His Followers Are Detected
and Overthrown," according to his provocative subtitle, Locke
directly attacked Filmer's scheme of patriarchy that would have
justified the monarchy's natural elevation to unrivaled governmental
power. Having thoroughly accomplished his task, in his mind at
least, Locke then turned his attention to ideal government based on
natural right, carefully setting out his rich scheme in his Second
Treatise. So crucial to developing colonial American thought
concerning government and, in the end, revolution,3 the Second
Treatise weaves between its lines rudimentary yet foundational
notions of constitutional review and, more critically, reasonable
limits constraining such review.
In his Second Treatise, "Concerning the True Original, Extent,
and End of Civil Government," Locke posits humanity in the
original as in "a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions,
and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit,
within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other Man."3 However, this "state
of nature," as Locke denominates it, is not "a State of Licence,"
humanity being constrained under the "Law of Nature" strictly
allowing that "no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health,
Liberty or Possessions."35 And while it is every person's right to
protect his freedom in the state of nature from anyone who would
invade it contrary to the Law of Nature, 36 he is naturally limited to
32. JOHN LOCia, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1970).
33. It is ironic that the philosophical document central to the triumph of Parliament
over the King closing the "Glorious Revolution" would also figure prominently in Great
Britain's inglorious defeat in the Revolutionary War, almost one century later.
34. See LOCKE, supra note 32, at 287.
35. Id. at 288-89.
36. Locke defines "two distinct Rights" against the contravener who "so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the Principles of Human Nature": The right of
"Punishing the Crime for restraint, and preventing the like Offence" and the right "of taking
reparation." Id. at 296. While the second inures to the injured party alone, of course, the
Vol. 39:729
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his own strength, in that state, in protecting his right, a limitation
that is substantial indeed. Thus, while Locke's "state of nature"
offers unparalleled freedoms, those freedoms are drastically
mitigated by the reality that they might degenerate into a "state of
war," by design of the more unprincipled in the same state, with
costs up to and even including that natural denizen's very life. It
is this extreme precariousness of life in the state of nature that
impels individuals out of its simultaneous expansive freedoms and
ultimate dangers, into the more restrained yet safer confines of
"Civil Society."
38
It is in this deliberate, intelligent act of establishing civil, political
society that Locke's innovative notion of limited government rests.
For in order to protect life and limb, or at the very least property,
39
individuals voluntarily quit the state of nature, ceding some of their
natural rights and freedoms to a created, centralized government
charged with protecting the society thus constituted.40 In this
scheme, then, government distinctly arises from the people, is
deliberately limited by specific act of the people creating it, and
serves at the behest of and for the betterment of those same
people. Being a government "of laws,"41 it expresses itself in "the
Legislative thereof to make Laws . . . as the publick good of the
Society shall require," "to the Execution whereof" by an established
Executive, and in "a Judge with Authority to determine all the
Controversies."42 And of course, critical to American colonists and
"patriots" of the late eighteenth century, the constituting people
always and forever retain the exclusive right of dissolution of the
"right of punishing is in every body." Id. at 292.
37. "And hence it is that he who attempts to get another Man into his Absolute Power,
does thereby put himself into a State of War with him; It being to be understood as a
Declaration of a Design upon his Life." Id. at 297.
38. "Thus Mankind, notwithstanding all the Privileges of the state of Nature, being but
in an ill condition while they remain in it, are quickly driven into Society." Id. at 370.
39. This arguably gave rise to the most famous aphorism attributed to John Locke:
"The great and Chief end therefore of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property." Id. at 368-69 (emphasis
omitted).
40. Locke puts the matter very succinctly: "Where ever therefore any numbers of Men
are so united into one Society, as to quit everyone his Executive Power of the Law of
Nature, and to resign it to the publick, there and there only is a Political, or Civil Society."
Id. at 343 (emphasis omitted).
41. That is to say, "settled standing Rules; indifferent, and the same to all Parties"
mediated by "Men having Authority from the Community, for the execution of those Rules."
Id. at 342.
42. Id. at 343.
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constituted government," when it appears to a majority to be in
that society's best interest to do so.
Implicit in Locke's scheme of government created by and serving
any coalescing political society are the critical functions of
constitution and constitutional review. The former is the very
enabling document by which civil government is both created and,
importantly, limited in favor of the constituting society. The latter
defines a process by which ambiguities in the meaning of aspects
of the document can be mediated, and alleged conflicts between
the constituting document and actions of the government
constituted thereby, adjudged and resolved. While Locke is by no
means clear as to the "how" of such a review function, there can
be no doubt as to the "what" of it, as well as the importance of
such review in the ordered workings of the constituted
government. Neither can there be any doubt of this: that the
organization inheriting the vital, delicate responsibility of
constitutional review must necessarily be an animate, powerful one;
indeed, the very viability of the created government and the civil
society served by it will necessarily rest on the proper mediation of
that singular function.
B. Judicial Review in the Founding Phase - 1776 to 1787
Notions of constitutional review generally, and judicial review
specifically, were clearly present in the developing American
thinking about government creation and management in pre-and
immediate post-Revolutionary America. Even before the
Revolutionary War (and in fact in anticipation of it), colonial voices
could be heard calling for the voiding of petit acts of legislatures
(in the specific cases in question, Parliament) that violated some
perceived "higher law." For example, when Boston merchants
found themselves faced with the imminent renewal of writs of
assistance by King's Superior Courts in Massachusetts Colony
under the infamous and detested Writs of Assistance Act," they
43. Locke canvasses a series of legitimate reasons for dissolution of government by the
original constituting people in his famous Chapter XIX: "Of the Dissolution of Government."
Id. at 424-46.
44. This was an Act of British Parliament essentially authorizing the issuance of a
generalized "John Doe" search warrant, giving the bearer broad powers to enter and search
virtually any premises at virtually any time. Id. at 47. Issued under authority of the English
monarch and in that monarch's name, they ran unbroken throughout the reign of the named
monarch and required no individual process whatsoever to be invoked. Id. For a concise
discussion of their use and effect, and colonial arguments against them, see KELLY &
HARBISON, supra note 24, at 47-48.
Vol. 39:729
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retained young James Otis to prosecute and press their unequivocal
negative. Otis' arguments on behalf of colonial concerns in 1761
were straightforward: "Thus reason and the (British) Constitution
are both against this writ . . . No acts of Parliament can establish
such a writ. Though it should be made in the very words of
petition, it would be void. An act against the Constitution is void."45
Four years thereafter a colonial Virginia county court judge went so
far as to hold the notorious Stamp Act of English Parliament to be
void at law, contradicting as it did, in that court's view, both the
British Constitution and Virginia's colonial charter rights. Even
though these and other similar actions were immediately
unsuccessful, they did engender significant post-Revolutionary
effect.4
6
In the intervening years between the successful conclusion of the
American Revolution and the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
some form of judicial review of acts of state legislatures was
evident across the eastern seaboard. The State of New Jersey
appears to have been the first to weigh in on the issue when a New
Jersey state court invalidated a 1778 act of its own state legislature
allowing for six-man juries in cases arising out of the confiscation
of "enemy goods."47 Rhode Island followed suit in 1786 when a
state court ruled an act of its legislature providing for the issuance
of paper money to be void at law, as contravening the old Rhode
Island Charter, that state's ersatz constitution at the time.48 North
Carolina evinced a similar disposition when that state's supreme
court voided a widely popular Revolutionary War Land Titles Act
as violating a North Carolina constitutional provision guaranteeing
to each of its citizens "undoubtedly a right to a decision of his
property by trial by jury."49 Evidence of similar acts of rudimentary
45. Id. at 48 (as recorded by John Adams).
46. They added significantly to the popular sentiment which gave rise to U.S. CONST.
amend. IV, a significant piece of jurisprudence by any effective measure.
47. Holmes v. Walton, New Jersey (1780). There the Court held the statute violative of
both the 1776 New Jersey State Constitution and the New Jersey common law. For a brief
discussion of that case, see KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 24, at 99.
48. Trevett v. Weeden, Rhode Island (1786). The issue was highly controversial in
Rhode Island at the time. Controlled by paper money interests, the state legislature roundly
condemned the actions of its court in a joint resolution, even seeking the removal of the
judges from the bench. KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 24, at 99-100.
49. KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 24, at 99. The case under discussion here is Bayard
v. Singleton, I N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787). There the originating act of the state legislature
confirmed titles on behalf of persons purchasing lands confiscated from Crown sympathizing
"Tories" during the Revolutionary War. Id. As in Rhode Island, the offending judges were
ordered to the bar of the legislature, though the actions of the Court were eventually
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judicial review by state courts negating state legislative actions
prior to the Constitution can also be found in Virginia (1782), New
York (1784), Connecticut (1785), Massachusetts (1786) and New
Hampshire (1787).5
Nor was the notion of some form of judicial negative over
legislative actions unfamiliar to many of the Conventioners
gathering in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. In addition to the
above-noted North Carolina conventioners, Elbridge Gerry of the
Massachusetts delegation specifically made note of the fact that
"[iun some States, the Judges had actually set aside laws as being
against the Constitution . . . with general approbation."5' Luther
Martin of Maryland similarly observed, "[als to the constitutionality
of laws, that point will come before the Judges in their proper
official character."52 James Madison appended a republican twist to
the argument, pointedly noting "[a] law violating a Constitution
established by the people themselves would be considered by the
Judges as null and void." Alexander Hamilton added:
[Limitations on the Legislative authority] can be preserved, in
practice, in no other way than through the medium of Courts
of Justice, whose duty it must be to declare all Acts contrary
to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing.m
Indeed, Professor Charles Warren definitively and persuasively
asserts that the entire Constitutional Convention was indirectly
exposed to instances of state judicial negatives of legislative acts,
and he named fully two dozen of its attendees who came to
explicitly support some form of active constitutional review
deliberately situated in the Judiciary.5
sustained, albeit with resistance. See id. at 100. Decided on May 29, 1787, immediately prior
to the Constitutional assembly in Philadelphia, there is little doubt that the decision was fully
available to conventioners gathering in that city; in fact, "the lawyers on both sides of this
case, William R. Davie and Richard D. Spaight, were members of the [Constitutional]
Convention." CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 45-46
(1925).
50. WARREN, supra note 49, at 46-48.
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 50 and at 43, respectively.
54. Id. at 69-70. That number includes Convention delegates from nearly all the states
represented, including such iconic names as Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson of
Pennsylvania, Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, George Mason of Virginia,
William Davie and Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney
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The notion of constitutional review of legislative action at least
partially involving the proposed judiciary was before the
momentous 1787 Convention virtually from the beginning. Indeed,
submitted on the second official Convention day (May 29, 1787),
the "Virginia Resolutions" included in their number "Resolution 8"
proposing the formation of "the Executive and a convenient
number of the National Judiciary" into a "Council of revision with
authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it
shall operate." 5 James Madison argued strongly in favor of such a
negating arrangement (along with fellow avowed nationalists
Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson and Charles Pinckney), averring
that "the judges must share the veto power because the executive
and judicial branches acting together would be too weak to
withstand the assaults of Congress."5 In convention amendments
dated July 24, August 6 and September 10, 1787, the "Judicial
Power" 7 came to "extend to all cases both in law and equity
of South Carolina and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, besides the aforementioned Gerry,
Martin, Madison and Hamilton.
55. THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 29 MAY, reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. VOLUME I CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS,
1776-1787, 244 (Merrill Jensen ed., State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1976). It is worth
noting that the proposed system of constitutional review in the tendered Virginia Plan did
not anticipate judicial review per se, but rather envisioned a hybrid "executive/judicial" entity
to which that responsibility would devolve. This "secondary institution" imitated
Pennsylvania in its own state constitution (1776), which called for the creation of a separate
elected body (the "Council of Censors"), serving limited terms, whose responsibility it was,
among other significant things, to "enquire whether the constitution has been preserved
inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government...
assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater powers than they are intitled (sic) to
by the constitution" and to "recommend to the legislature the repealing such laws as appear
to them to have been enacted contrary to the principles of the constitution." PA CONST. of
1776, Sect. 47 (1776). Though this study considers the development of judicial review from
Revolutionary times forward, it is worth remembering that only the fact of the necessity of
constitutional review was static throughout this period; the means by which this review
should effectively be conducted were indeed very fluid, intellectually and politically, and
remained so through the 1803 decision of the Supreme Court in Marbury, and in fact
beyond. These competitive views of "constitution," and, hence, constitutional review, can be
seen in pure form in the contrasting visions of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, writing for the
majority, and Mr. Justice Joseph Story, writing passionately in dissent, in Charles River
Bridge. See supra note 16. The matter was more or less settled there, in the Chief Justice's
majority opinion, and "contractarian judicial review" quickly grew to be the order of the
antebellum day.
56. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55,
at 238.
57. This wording specifically replaced "Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." Id. at 281.
And, by logical inference, it extended the .power of the proposed Court in some unstated
way. This amending language was submitted to the Convention by a "Committee of Style"
consisting of Chair William Samuel Johns of Connecticut, Rufus King of Massachusetts,
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arising under this constitution"" - language that is presently
included in the Constitution. Though the final product did not
specifically include language of judicial review inuring to the newly
proposed Court, events immediately following the close of the
Convention suggest such a power to have been in the minds of at
least some of the Conventioners who were responsible for the
document's final draft.
Specifically, through the involvement of several delegates to the
1787 constitutional deliberations in Philadelphia, notions of a
judicial negative approaching full judicial review surfaced in several
of the state constitutional ratifying conventions. James Wilson
positively raised the matter in the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, declaring to the assembly on December 1, 1787, a clear
remedy for extra-constitutional actions of the proposed legislature:
Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris and James Madison, the latter three staunch
nationalists, adding Mr. King to their number as delegates supporting active judicial review. It
was adopted by vote of the full Convention on September 10, 1787. Id. at 270. An implied
inclusion of judicial review within the scope of the amending language can only be surmised,
without definitive support.
58. This language was added by the above noted Comnittee of Style and adopted by
vote of the full Convention September 10, 1787. Id. This language would appear to
strengthen notions of implied judicial review within the Supreme Court enabling language,
with at least some limited external support. For example, in the Pennsylvania State
Constitutional Ratifying Convention, delegate Robert Whitehill based his arguments against
ratification partly on powers extended to the Supreme Court "too extensive for the safety
and happiness of the people." ROBERT WHITEHALL, SPEECH BEFORE THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RATIFICATION CONVENrON (December 7, 1787), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTUTUTION, VOLUME 11, RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
BY THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 513 (Merill Jensen ed., State Historical Society of Wisconsin
1976). Presumably he referred to notions of "judicial review." Later that same day delegate
and Constitutional Conventioner James Wilson opposed Whitehill in the following
illuminating language:
The Article respecting the judicial department is objected to as going too far and is
supposed to carry a very indefinite meaning. Let us examine this - the judicial power
shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution and the
laws of the United States. Controversies may certainly arise under this Constitution
and the laws of the United States, and is it not proper that there should be judges to
decide them? The honorable gentleman from Cumberland (Robert Whitehill) says, that
laws may be made inconsistent with the Constitution; and that therefore the powers
given to the judges are dangerous . .. I think the contrary inference true. If a law
should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by this instrument in Congress,
the judges, as a consequence . .. [of] the particular powers of government being
defined, will declare such law to be null and void. For the power of the Constitution
predominates. Anything, therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress contrary thereto
will not have the force of law.
JAMES WILSON, SPEECH BEFORE THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIFICATION CONVENTION
(1787), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra, at 517.
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"When [the judges] . . . consider its principles and find it to be
incompatible with the superior power of the Constitution, it is their
duty to pronounce it void."59 Constitutional Conventioner Oliver
Ellsworth was equally articulate in favor of a firm power of judicial
review for the Supreme Court as proposed under the Constitution,
noting bluntly:
If the general legislature should at any time over leap their
[constitutional] limits, the judicial department is a constitu-
tional check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if
they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it
is void; and the judicial power, the national judges . . . will
declare it to be void 0
While little can be generalized from the above examples, they do
establish the fact that at least two significant Conventioners left
Philadelphia in the late summer of 1787 with some explicit under-
standing of judicial review falling to the created Court under the
creating document. Equally important is the fact that those same
Conventioners, and probably others like them, saw such review in
relatively narrow terms, apparently restricting it to the negating of
acts of Congress reasonably perceived to be in contravention of the
letter of the Constitution. The significance of this apparent restric-
tion will be explored more thoroughly hereafter.
III. POST-CONSTITUTION JuDICIAL REVIEW - NEGATIITY AND
CREATnMW
The years between the completion of the draft United States
Constitution in September, 1787, and the not inauspicious pro-
nouncements of Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison saw several significant developments in relation to "judi-
59. JAMES WILSON, SPEECH BEFORE THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIFICATION
CONVENTION (Dec. 7, 1787), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 451. Wilson repeated like arguments at other points in the
debates, specifically December 4, 1787, and December 7, 1787; the latter argument was
editorialized in the PENNsYLvANA HERALD, Dec. 8, 1787. Id. at 492, 517, 524.
60. OLIVER EuswOm, SPEECH BEFORE THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIFICA-
TION CONVENTION (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION. VOLUME IlI. RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES. DELAWARE. NEW
JERSEY. GEORGIA CONNECTICUT, at 553 (Merrill Jensen ed., State Historical Society of Wisconsin
1978) Other specific acknowledgments of some form of review resting properly in the judici-
ary can be found in the ratifying debates of North Carolina (William R. Davie, John Steele),
Virginia (George Nicholas, John Marshall himself), Maryland (Luther Martin), New York and
Massachusetts. WARREN, supra note 49, at 68-70.
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cial review." First, the debate on both the "what" and the "whether"
of a judicial constitutional negative figured importantly - if not
prominently - in the intellectually vivid Federalist/Anti-Federalist
debates immediately prior to the eventual ratification of the Consti-
tution.6' Much of significance can be found in those debates that is
directly relevant to this present reconsideration of judicial review.
The last years of the momentous eighteenth century in America
saw the issue of a judicial constitutional negative move more
closely to the center of American political thinking in the wake of
the Alien and Sedition Acts debates.62 Of course, the matter was
"settled" by the Supreme Court in 1803, in favor of some rudimen-
tary notion of "judicial review," although this article will go on to
consider a more fundamental question arising from the intriguing
work of the Chief Justice in Marbury - precisely "which judicial
review" did the Chief Justice's words embrace?
A. "Brutus," "Publius," and the Limited Judicial Negative
As might be expected of those persons registering genuine fear
of strong central government in the constitutional ratification
period, individuals gathered together loosely under the "Anti-
Federalist" banner wrote broadly and vigorously against a host of
anticipated ills deriving from the proposed Constitution. Among the
concerns expressed were those explicitly related to the proposed
Supreme Court. General doubts were raised about the breadth of
jurisdiction advanced to the proposed Court - law, equity, and, in
certain instances, fact - and the departure from the British model
of diffusion of these separable functions to individualized courts.63
Anti-Federalists also floated nameless fears that the state court sys-
tems would come to be fully eclipsed by the more glamorous pro-
61. Directly after the Constitutional Convention closed in Philadelphia, the issue of rati-
fication having then devolved to the popular forum, proponents and opponents of the draft
Constitution turned with equal zeal to the only "mass" medium available to influence the
popular will - the newspaper. Detailed essays began to appear in significant communities
across the young country, bearing such imposing noms des plumes as "Brutus," "Centinel,"
and "Cincinnatus" on the Anti-Federalist ledger (opponents of strong "federal" government),
and "Americanus," "Fabius," and, most notably, "Publius" for the Federalists (proponents of
stronger central government), all seeking to influence the final outcome. Conducted from
October, 1787, through mid-summer of 1788, when the ratification battle was won by the
Federalist side, the debates proved entertaining and informative in their day, and richly inter-
esting historically thereafter.
62. More will be said about these Acts herein.
63. LETTERS FROM THE "FEDERAL FARMER" TO "THE REPUBLICAN," NEW YORK LETER III
(OCTOBER 10, 1787), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION. PART ONE, at 273 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., The Library of America 1993).
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posed federal courts. 64 However, the most virulent and troubling
criticisms of the proposed Court centered on the notion of "counter
majoritarianism" - the Court's effective supremacy over the legis-
lative and executive branches as a consequence of the practical
workings of "judicial review." And nowhere were these arguments
more pristinely or forcefully advanced than in the essay denomi-
nated "Brutus XV."
65
Continuing a critique of the proposed Court commenced in "Bru-
tus XI," published in the New York Journal on January 31, 1788,
and carried on in the same journal over the ensuing seven weeks,
the author of "Brutus XV" focused immediately on the "immense
powers" afforded the Court under the proposed Constitution.66
"Brutus" clearly articulated his view of the debilitating effects of
the immense power complained of:
[T]he judges under this constitution will controul the legisla-
ture, for the supreme court are authorised in the last resort, to
determine what is the extent of the powers of the Congress;
they are to give the Constitution an explanation, and there is
no power above them to sit aside their judgment.
67
This charge relates to counter majoritarianism of the most virile
strain - final decisions on acts of the legislature ultimately falling
to an institution removed from the people and fully insulated from
their ready reach. Indeed, "Brutus" rails against it throughout the
64. "BRUTUS L" NEW YORK JOURNAL (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CON-
SITrUTION, PART ONE, supra note 63, at 168.
65. Originally published in the N.Y. Journal, Mar. 20, 1788: "BRUrus" xv, NEW YORK JOUR-
NAL (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART Two, at 372 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., The Library of America 1993). Though actual authorship of the "Brutus" essays
remains contested, most scholars have settled on Robert Yates, a New York delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, as the actual penman. Other possible nominees include New York
Congressional delegate Abraham Yates, Jr., Richard Henry Lee, John Jay, New York Governor
George Clinton, Thomas Treadwell and Melancthon Smith. See THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. VOLUME XIII. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION. PUBLIC
AND PrvATE. VOLUME 1. 21 FEBRUARY TO 7 NOVEMBER 1787 411 (John P. Kaminsid & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1981).
66. "BRUTUS xv," supra note 65, at 372. "[T]he supreme court under this constitution
would be exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to no controul .... I
question whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice invested with
such immense powers. . . ." Id.
67. Id. at 372-73. The nature of that power was equally clear - judicial review, in some
form or fashion: "The supreme court then have a right, independent of the legislature, to give
a construction to the constitution and every part of it .... If, therefore, the legislature pass
any laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitution, they will declare
it void . . . _" Id. at 376.
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essay.68 "Brutus" warned that even the "errors" of such a body are
beyond the peoples' reach, and therefore beyond amendment or
even adjustment. 69 The result, according to "Brutus," was a created
governmental entity fully and finally above even the creating people
themselves - a tyranny in the fullest sense considered by Locke,
Montesquieu and Rousseau.
A far different portrait of the nature and power of the proposed
Supreme Court flows from the contrapuntal pen of "Publius" in the
famous Federalist 78.70 Commencing with a view as to the "neces-
sity of a federal judicature"71 in a limited constitutional republic,
Hamilton minces no words in positing and denominating the
responsibility falling to such a judicature in such a republic - con-
stitutional review:
By a limited constitution I understand one which contains cer-
tain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such for
instance as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post
facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be pre-
served in practice no other way than through the medium of
the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. With-
out this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing.72
The reality of such a responsibility appears to be a matter of com-
mon sense to Hamilton - the nature of the legislative limitation
being one of law deriving from the Constitution, it is incongruous
to allow the limited legislature to police its own limitations.73 And
neither does this limited negative raise the ... [Court] above either
the legislature or the people, as "Brutus" had pointedly charged,
but rather:
It only supposed that the power of the people is superior to
both; and that where the will of the legislature declared in its
68. "[Tlhe judicial under this system have a power which is above the legislative, and
which indeed transcends any power before given to a judicial by any free government under
heaven." Id. at 373.
69. "There is no power above them that can correct their errors or controul their deci-
sions - The adjudications of this court are final and irreversible, for there is no court above
them to which appeals can lie, either in error or on the merits." Id. at 374.
70. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, "PUBLIUS" THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (1788), reprinted in THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART Two, supra note 65, at 467-75.
71. Id. at 467.
72. Id. at 469.
73. Id. at 470.
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statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in
the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter,
rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions
by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not
fundamental.7 4
Neither is Hamilton shy about the effect of so weighty a respon-
sibility on the power relationship between the three separate fed-
eral government entities - "the judiciary is beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power"75 - though he does
append a caveat important to the tenor of this study:
[TIhough individual oppression may now and then proceed
from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people
can never be endangered from that quarter: I mean, so long as
the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative
and executive. For I agree that "there is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers.76
While "Brutus" and "Publius" clearly occupy opposite positions in
the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debates regarding the nature and
effect of the proposed Supreme Court, this study is benefited more
by a view to the commonalities of the two essays than their differ-
ences. Both acknowledge some constitutional review power inuring
to the Court by virtue of the enabling Constitution, though they are
not in agreement as to its propriety, nature or ultimate effect. Both
seem to posit that implied review in the essential character of a
"negative" rather than a "positive," each writer employing the negat-
ing notion of "voiding" to characterize the work of the Court in this
regard. 7 And while each approaches the matter differently, "Bru-
74. Id. Here Hamilton essentially suggests the review power of the Court to lie more
correctly in the nature of a "counter-counter majoritarianism," the colorful phrase preferred
by modern day students of judicial review. As the true jurisprudential nature of judicial
review is not the specific subject of this paper, nothing more is appropriate here than the
pointing out of this fact.
75. Id. at 468. Here Hamilton is reiterating his more famous earlier stated aphorism:
"[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the constitution." Id. He cites Montesquieu in his text in support of the
general point.
76. Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added). Here he relies on Montesquieu again in the quoted
material.
77. "Brutus" notes: "If, therefore, the legislature pass any laws inconsistent with the
sense the judges put upon the constitution,-they will declare it void.. . ." "BRUTUS" xv, supra
note 65, at 376. Hamilton joined him in a similar negative characterization of the implied
power falling to the Court "whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
2001
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tus" via the dire language of fear and alarm, and "Publius" from the
more emotionally distant language of vague danger, each impliedly
recognizes some nameless, ominous effect associated with the
Court's wandering out of its narrow negating role into something
broader and more vigorous. As this latter point of agreement
involves the ultimate role and effect of the Supreme Court in the
most delicately balanced governmental system in the world, it can-
not be passed over without further scrutiny.
For the moment, let us return to the Lockean "bottom-up"
scheme of government creation. "People" (the ultimate sovereigns,
by beneficence of nature) self-interestedly quit the "state of nature"
and endow government with just such powers (and no more) as
are necessary for the protection of their persons and effects.78 That
government naturally expresses itself in three separable forms with
demarcated functions - the legislative (bearing the creative func-
tion), the executive (bearing the administrative or synthesizing
function), and the judiciary (bearing the enforcement and manage-
ment functions). 7 While any blurring of the carefully drawn lines
between the three federal functionaries might be debilitating, it is
not difficult to view such blurring involving the Supreme Court to
be especially so, for the simple reason that it alone is the one
department lying outside the easy reach of the constituting peo-
ple.8 0 Should the court engraft anything like a creative role to its
negative judicial functions, the results might be seen as potentially
dire indeed.81 With these things in mind, we might now turn atten-
tenor of the constitution void." HAmITON, supra note 70, at 469.
78. The "endowing document" memorializing this power transfer by which government
is initiated is the "constitution," of course, which name derives from its ultimate constituting
nature and effect. In the Lockean scheme presently considered, the importance of the consti-
tuting document cannot be overstated; it literally denotes with a bright line the place where
the constituted government's power ends and the people's retained "natural" rights continue.
79. More mundanely, the legislative uses law to create ways and means for manage-
ment and smooth function of the civil society it serves; the executive both actuates those
plans and manages them for the benefit of the civil society it serves; and the judiciary
(among other things) mediates the vital constituting agreement between the constituted gov-
ernment and the constituting civil society. All functions are important, of course, but, put in
these terms, the paramount function of the Supreme Court might be more easily seen.
80. This establishes the logic behind Hamilton's strong averment that "liberty can have
nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union
with either of the other departments . .. ." See HAMTON, supra note 70, at 469.
81. Locke, Rousseau and Montesquieu agreed that such an amalgamation of power
would effectively result in bald tyranny - benign or vital, as it may choose to express itself -
but tyranny in any event. Speaking in a "great debate" in the U.S. Congress in 1802 involving
the very matter of judicial review, Rep. Archibald Henderson agreed: "Concentrating judicial
and legislative power in the same hands. . . is the very definition of tyranny; and wherever
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tion to Marbury v. Madison, considering what the words of Chief
Justice Marshall may have accomplished in relation to the impor-
tant concept of the particular "judicial" form of constitutional
review embraced by the particular republic in question.
B. Marshall, Marbury and "Creative" Judicial Review
The years between the ratification of the Constitution and the
decision of the Supreme Court in Marbury saw the issue of consti-
tutional negative/review occupy a small yet important part in the
nation's ensuing discovery of the true nature of its singular charter.
Various institutions in line for the "office" of constitutional reviewer
made themselves known in the suddenly energized public forum of
the 1790's, though it is likely that a majority of interested persons
favored the judiciary as the best repository for the important role.
82
With the passage of President John Adams' Alien and Sedition Acts
in 1798, this issue moved to the forefront of political concern, with
several states claiming in themselves the valid right of constitu-
tional review within their borders against the vociferous objections
of otherss 3 The Supreme Court first entered the picture in 1796 in
you find it, the people are slaves, whether they call their government a monarchy, republic
or democracy." See WARREN, supra note 49, at 175.
82. Kelly and Harbison report that "Prior to 1803, a decided majority of the bench and
bar had apparently considered judicial review a necessary part of the constitutional system."
See KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 24, at 230.
83. In real anticipation of possible war with France in and around 1798, President
Adams conceived and Congress passed An Act Concerning Aliens (approved June 25, 1798)
and Sedition Act (approved July 14, 1798). Aimed at French and Irish immigrants feared as
"spies," the first raised the naturalization waiting period from 5 to 14 years and gave to the
Executive unprecedented unilateral departure and removal powers over aliens, while the sec-
ond crininalized seditious writings, broadly defined to include "malicious" utterances against
the government. Of dubious constitutionality, the Acts were in fact widely popular in the
xenophobic pre-war atnosphere of the day, though of limited actual effect. They resulted in
a sum total of 25 prosecutions, 10 convictions and 1 deportation throughout their duration.
However, the debate concerning their constitutionality was potent and formative. First Ken-
tucky and then Virginia declared the Acts of no force within their respective borders, claim-
ing for themselves and all states the power of constitutional negative over federal legislation.
State after state passed resolutions vilifying the Kentucky/Virginia initiative, usually in stri-
dent and inflammatory language. Those states specifically placing this review power concep-
tually in the hands of the Federal Judiciary included Rhode Island (February, 1799: "The judi-
cial power shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States");
Massachusetts (February 9, 1799: "[T]he decision of all cases in law and equity, arising under
the Constitution... are exclusively vested by the people in the judicial courts of the United
States."); New Hampshire (June 14, 1799: "[Tjhe proper tribunals to determine the Constitu-
tionality of the laws of the general government is . . . the judicial Department."); and Ver-
mont (October 30, 1799: "[The power] to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by the
general government [is] ... vested in the Judiciary courts of the Union."). Thomas Jefferson
repealed the personally detested Acts shortly after succeeding Adams to the Presidency,
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the case of Hylton v. United Statess4 wherein the Court appeared
to take for granted the fact that it was empowered to determine
the constitutionality of a Congressional action, though it did not
explicitly state so.8 5 By the turn of the eighteenth century, the stage
was nicely set for the important decision of the Court in Marbury.
The story behind the first great constitutional law decision ema-
nating from the Supreme Court86 is well known, and so will be
given only the barest treatment here.87 Stunned by an unexpected
electoral defeat to Thomas Jefferson, President John Adams and
his Federalists sought to extend the Federalist presence in govern-
ment long after his and his party's departure from office. Taking
advantage of a Congressional act related to the District of Colum-
bia passed in 1801, President Adams first created a series of new
Justice of the Peace offices and filled the posts with Federalist
appointees. The commissioning documents were duly signed by the
President and sealed by his Secretary of State, the Honorable John
Marshall. But in the rushed events of the Adams administration's
closing days, several commissions remained to be delivered to the
appointees by the incoming Secretary of State, James Madison. Not
in any way amused by what he viewed as blatant "pork barreling,"
newly inaugurated President Jefferson ordered Madison not to
deliver the same - the commissions were thereafter conveniently
"lost" in some corner of the Secretary of State's office. One of the
frustrated appointees, Mr. William Marbury, brought an original
action in mandamus before the Supreme Court and its recently
appointed Chief Justice - the same John Marshall - seeking
delivery of the signed and sealed commission allowing him to
legally accede to his coveted office.ss
their constitutionality never being formally tested. For a general discussion of the Acts and
state's responses to them, see JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDI-
TION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956); and JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM THE
ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1952).
84. 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 171 (1796).
85. Kelly and Harbison note, "[bly 1800, nearly all federal justices, as well as a majority
of the legal profession, had accepted the principle that the Supreme Court could declare acts
of Congress unconstitutional and therefore invalid." See KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 24, at
193. Nevertheless, it would be simply wrong to suggest that such a view was universal.
86. Carl Brent Swisher called Marbury v. Madison "the first of outstanding permanent
importance to be decided by the Supreme Court." CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL DEVELoPMENT 101 (1943).
87. For a more detailed review of the background surrounding the decision, see DON-
ALD DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF MARBURY V. MADISON
(1970); and ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, Marbury v. Madison AND JUDICIAL REVIEw (1989).
88. Marbury claimed original jurisdiction to lie with the Supreme Court by virtue of the
enabling legislation of the Judicature Act of 1789, thus broadening that Court's original juris-
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Speaking on behalf of all six voices then sitting and active on the
Supreme Court,89 the Chief Justice carefully laid out the issues in
the politically delicate case and settled each of them consistently
with his and his party's partisan predilections. Mr. Marbury's com-
missioning was indeed complete with the President's signature and
the Secretary of State's seal, giving him a vested, legal right in the
sought after commission; and, that right being vested and legally in
his favor, the laws of the country must naturally afford some kind
of responsive remedy.
The Chief Justice began his approach to the fateful third issue -
whether the "proper remedy" embraced mandamus issued by the
Supreme Court - by separating it into component parts. He settled
the first part quickly and categorically: "This, then, is a plain case
for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it
from the record."90 It was in his treatment of the second part -
whether that remedy should issue originally from the Court - that
matters became interesting, and indeed historic. If one simply
noted the plain language of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that estab-
lished the Supreme Court and authorized it to "issue writs of man-
damus ... to any... persons holding office, under the authority of
the United States,"91 the matter would have appeared to have fallen
entirely in Mr. Marbury's favor, unless "the law ... [was] unconsti-
tutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the
authority, and assigning the duties which its words purported to
confer and assign."92 Proceeding, however, under the direction of
his bold and now famous aphorism that "[iut is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is,"9 the Chief Justice found original jurisdiction in his Court to be
diction beyond that explicitly granted in the Constitution. An outcome from the Marshal-led
Supreme Court in favor of the man whose very name he had signed as Secretary of State on
the undelivered document in question was so widely expected that President Jefferson was
rumored to have ordered impeachment articles prepared for the Chief Justice, to be acted on
upon release of his expected decision.
89. One of the great innovations brought to the bench by the "father of the Supreme
Court" was the insistence upon a solo opinion from an unanimous Court whenever possible
- per curiam - doing away with its previous practice, adopted from the British House of
Lords, of opinions seriatim. The intent was to create a public impression of a united Court,
one that tended to speak "with one voice" as it were. In this way the institution grew tre-
mendously in status and mystique throughout the tenure of Chief Justice Marshall's leader-
ship.
90. See supra note 20, at 173.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 177.
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narrowly delimited by the Constitution itself, with the startling
result that "[tihe authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court,
by the [Judiciary Act of 1789] ... to issue writs of mandamus to
public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution...
."94 President Jefferson, therefore, had won 95 - Mr. Marbury did
not receive from the Court the thing it had categorically found him
to have been fully deserving of by right. But the Supreme Court
had won also, drawing to itself a singular authority that would
prove dramatic in the hundreds of years following.
While much can be said about the notion of "judicial review"
deriving from Chief Justice Marshall's cleverly crafted opinion in
Marbury, this study is content to focus attention on the very last
word of his often repeated pronouncement, that "[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."96 As an averment of vision, it is a weighty statement
without doubt; as an exposition of "judicial review" it should be
seen as imprecise, and thereby profoundly problematic. To begin
with, it is quite simply incorrect, either in the Lockean sense of
mediating the constituting document on behalf of its creators, or in
the "constitutional negative" sense preferred by the Founders and
the subject of apparent agreement throughout the constitutional
ratification period. Revisiting Locke, it is always and forever "the
people" - the creators of limited government and the erectors of
its boundaries - who "say what the law is."97 The Court possesses
a more mundane role of alerting "the people," in pertinent fact,
when a boundary they have deliberately drawn has been trans-
gressed by a governmental entity that they have deliberately cre-
ated. Given the ultimate effect of the Court's words when exercis-
ing constitutional review, it is more precise and, therefore, more
valuable, as a matter of constitutional orthodoxy, to recast the
emphatic "province and duty" of the Court in terms of what the
(inferior) law is not - "the people" remaining the only entity
empowered to set out what the (superior) law in fact is.
With regard to the early American notions of "judicial review"
94. Id. at 176.
95. No fool, of course, in political matters or anything else, President Jefferson was
fully and frustratingly aware of the pyrrhic nature of the "victory" Chief Justice Marshall had
offered him, and wrote against the Chief Justice and his extreme notion of constitutional
review throughout the remainder of his storied political career.
96. As with President Clinton, so with the phrase in question - much depends on
"what the meaning of the word is is"!
97. Here, of course, I refer to the "superior law" which trumps all inferior laws in the
republican sense.
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from which the Marshallian statement would appear to have
originated, the language problem would seem to become even more
critical. For all the various notions of "constitutional" or "judicial"
review preceding Marbury appeared to share in common the
notion of a negative outcome at their conclusion, a rendering of
something "to be not," if you will, rather than "to (creatively) be."
There is a sense of "negativity" in these originating notions of judi-
cial review, a sense of something deconstructed or rendered inert
at the full end of its work, rather than something created, or new,
left in its wake. It is in this counterposition of creativity and nega-
tivity that a more precise and instructive language of review of the
ultimate work of the Supreme Court might be formulated, one that
moves deliberately away from partisan political attacks (and
equally partisan political dismissals) toward a value-neutral check
of its vitality, consistent with Lockean constitutional orthodoxy.
And in theory, at least, such an effective test would appear to be
necessary, as, given the association of constitutional review, crea-
tivity, and tyranny outlined earlier, the sort of mischief such an
entity might effectively engender when acting "creatively" rather
than "negatively," even if unwittingly, might be very great indeed.
IV. A LEGACY OF "CREATIVE" REVIEW
Stripped of shrill and obfuscating charges of "judicial legislation"
and "super legislature," the problems associated with "creative judi-
cial review" remain both potent and immense. Indeed, the presently
preferred challenge language of "super legislature" adds to its other
disabilities the fact that it is palpably imprecise, and, arguably, dan-
gerous in its imprecision. A "creative" Supreme Court is not actu-
ally "legislative" - "super" or otherwise - nor does it act in a
truly legislative manner (as that term derives meaning in the Ameri-
can context). Rather, such a Court acts in a capacity far more
troublesome than this. In fact, the entity that leaves something new
in the wake of its work with the Constitution is acting more in the
nature of a sitting constitutional convention. Its pronouncements
are in fact edicts - they are ratified by no one and become, of an
instant, the "supreme law of the land." In truth, a healthy constitu-
tional system can (and probably must) live with some of this; but if
the reviewing entity makes unratified edicts in relation to funda-
mental animating principles of the republic - principles involving
human rights, natural law and the like98 - the results can be fright-
98. These are "load-bearing" beams, if you will, in the American constitutional edi-
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ening. An exploration of this thesis in the context of two of the
most notorious99 cases in the history of the United States Supreme
Court - Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade - should prove illuminative.
A. Dred Scott v. John FA. Sandford
Nothing struck more at the heart of the new republic than this
fundamental human dichotomy/hypocrisy - purloined labor via
enforced perpetual human bondage in the very shadow of virile
revolutionary rhetoric of equality.1°° Southern financial commitment
to the inhuman trade through the first third of the nineteenth cen-
tury grew even as its moral acceptability plummeted, both at home
and abroad, though a dark, restless genius from South Carolina,
John C. Calhoun, did much to reinvigorate Southern self-delusion
regarding slavery through his widely disseminated "positive good"
speech.10 1 The late 1840's saw the end of a politically motivated war
with Mexico and the development of a new, dangerous issue there-
after whether Southerners would be allowed (by law) to join
northerners in lucrative westward territorial expansion, carrying
their "peculiar property" with them. It was at precisely this time,
and in direct consequence of this inflammatory controversy sur-
rounding "territorial slavery" that an odd, remarkable thing
occurred - politicians began to openly admit that the political pro-
cess was breaking down with regard to its ability to compromise
the intractable matter of slavery in America, territorial or other-
wise. Instead, politicians turned optimistically to the Supreme
ice.
99. This is applied in a non-pejorative sense.
100. Indeed, University of Wisconsin legal historian Arthur McEvoy is entirely correct
in employing in tandem two otherwise incompatible terms to describe America at its founda-
tional roots - slave republic. And neither was this dichotomy lost on eighteenth century
America. The number of American "founders" commenting on the anti-revolutionary irony of
the slavery institution, including many who themselves owned slaves, is notoriously
immense.
101. Delivered during the fiery debates surrounding a Senate resolution to censure
"abolition petitions" and pass them unread from the Senate floor, Senator Calhoun recon-
figured the morality of slavery in a way theretofore thought to have been impossible, stating
baldly:
But I take higher ground. I hold that in the present state of civilization, where two
races of different origin, and distinguished by color, and other physical differences, as
well as intellectual, are brought together, the relation now existing in the slave-holding
States between the two, is, instead of an evil, a good - a positive good.
JOHN C. CALHOUN, XIII THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 395 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1980.)
Defending his remarkable thesis in eloquent tones, his words were received as anathema
among anti-slavery apologists, but "manna" in the South. From words like these an aggres-
sive Southern confidence eventually coalesced that had its fateful fulfillment in the Civil War.
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Court for a resolution of the issue.102 History is also relatively
homogeneous in its belief that the Court itself, both cognizant of
the remarkable political atmosphere of that day regarding slavery
and aware of the eyes of the nation upon it in this regard, came
also to embrace this odd idea of "settling" the otherwise labyrin-
thine political issue.'0 3 It had its first opportunity to work this pro-
posed magic with the Dred Scott case.
Born into slavery in Missouri and held in bondage there in the St.
Louis area for most of his life, Dred Scott based his claim for free-
dom on two separate earlier occurrences - first, residence with
his "master" for a period of approximately eighteen months in the
Wisconsin Territories west of the Mississippi River (present day
Minnesota); 14 second, residence for an equivalent period of time,
under similar circumstances, in the "free state" of minois. 10 5 He
pressed his claim in state court and was successful at trial, receiv-
ing a verdict in favor of his freedom, though it was reversed on
defendant's appeal to the Missouri State Supreme Court, in a split
102. While it is easy to document the fact of this transformation - every major late
antebellum political compromise of the slavery issue, from the Clayton Compromise (1848)
through the "Great Compromise" of 1850 and the infamous Kansas/Nebraska Act (1854)
included a clause providing direct appellate jurisdiction of slavery related issues to the
Supreme Court - it is much more difficult to understand why. Yet the phenomenon was
real. Political leaders as diverse as Jefferson Davis and John C. Calhoun on the one side, and
Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln on the other, men who could agree on nothing by
the close of the 1840s, all met together on this single remarkable point - the volatile matter
of the place of slavery within the republic would be fully and finally settled by the United
States Supreme Court. Though it is impolitic to judge actions of another age by present day
standards, the naivete remains striling.
103. Justice James M. Wayne of Georgia, one of the Supreme Court Justices sitting on
the Dred Scott Court, left no doubt as to the Court's ill-fated motivations in this regard: "The
case involves private rights of value and constitutional principles of the highest importance,
about which there had become such a difference of opinion that the peace and harmony of
the country required the settlement of them by judicial decision." LOREN MILLER, THE PITION-
ERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 76-77 (1966). Mr.
Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney and others on his bench are on record with similar
remarkable pronouncements.
104. This area was rendered forever free territory by operation of Thomas Jefferson's
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Dred's legal argument held that, having taken up some form of
residence there, in a place where slavery was legally outlawed, the positive law incidents of
slavery effectively dissipated and were replaced by the natural right of freedom. His argu-
ments were by no means specious in this regard - many thousands of "slaves" had received
freedom on just such a theory in state courts across the nation, including Southern state
courts. Indeed, Dred Scott's argument was fully supported by Missouri state court precedent
at the time it was made.
105. The details surrounding all aspects of the thoroughly unique case of Dred Scott
are fascinating, both in their drama, story, and historical significance. The student interested
in learning more about the matter could not do better than Professor Fehrenbacher's Pulitzer
Prize winning treatment of the subject. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 6.
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decision, 2-1.
When a motion for a new trial in state court was denied, counsel
on behalf of Dred Scott relied on diversity jurisdiction to remove
the matter into the federal courts."06 The suit wound its way
through the federal courts, yielding a verdict against Dred Scott in
the federal circuit court, and finally arrived in Roger Brooke
Taney's Supreme Court in 1856, some ten years after it was com-
menced. After two sets of oral arguments (February 11-14 and
December 15-18, 1856) and an aborted plan of the Court to write a
short, non controversial opinion against his freedom based on ear-
lier, relatively benign Supreme Court precedent,10 7 Chief Justice
Taney delivered the self-styled "Opinion of the Court,"08 one of the
most odious opinions in the institution's history.
While the gist of Mr. Taney's ruling was that the Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to hear Dred Scott's freedom claim, his
opinion made no effort to simply stop there. In the Chief Justice's
opinion, Dred Scott, and indeed all African origin persons in the
country, "slave" or free, were incapable of receiving and maintain-
ing American citizenship due to a naturally debilitated and inferior
106. By that stage Dred Scott argued that his "papers" were owned by Mr. John EA.
Sandford, a purported millionaire fur trader residing in New York, who it appears had never
actually met Dred, but who took the "papers" from his sister, Dred's original "owner," for all
intents and purposes. Counsel for Dred Scott simply took advantage of the purported diver-
sity of citizenship to "make a federal case out of it."
107. This precedent was Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 Howard) 82 (1850), a case
originating in Kentucky involving men held in bondage in Kentucky who claimed freedom
based on extended residence in Ohio on behalf of and with the permission of their "master."
In that case, the Court was relatively succinct: regardless of the effect of prior extended resi-
dency in a "free" state, they had voluntarily returned to Kentucky - were making their claim
to freedom from there in fact - where the status of slavery had "re-attached." Such a simple
treatment of Dred Scott's case was clearly available to the Court, and it is a matter of end-
less historical speculation why it was not preferred by Chief Justice Taney and his bench.
For a general treatment of this point, see ROBERT McCLOsKEY, supra note 3, at 94.
108. This is an ironic euphemism given the reality that each Justice weighed in with a
separate opinion on the matter, producing over 240 printed pages in total, and clear agree-
ment on very little. Indeed, one academic cites the contemporaneous work of noted Supreme
Court historian George Ticknor Curtis who, upon carefully analyzing and harmonizing the
opinions of each Justice ruling in Dred Scott, concluded that "there was no 'majority' deci-
sion at all." Frederick S. Allis, Jr., The Dred Scott Labyrinth, reprinted in TEACHERS OF His-
TORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LAURENCE BRADFORD PACKARD 348 (H. Stuart Hughes ed., 1954). The
reversion to seriatim opinions in Dred Scott had its own debilitating effect on the authority
of the decision. In this regard, John P. Frank notes, quite rightly, "if ever there was a case in
which the majority at least should have spoken with one voice, it was here. The discord
stripped the Court of the Olympian quality which it needs particularly when delivering a
judgment that will offend a large section of the country." JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE
SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 83 (1958).
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state attending the entire race. 109 Chief Justice Taney further
averred that "slaves" occupied the status of "property" in the Amer-
ican context1 and that Congress' power to govern the territories
did not derive from the plain language of Article IV, Section 3 of
the Constitution."' As a result of these limitations, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had no power to abolish slavery in the territo-
ries,1 2 rendering the Missouri Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional
and void.
1 3
The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney provides a rich milieu
from which to consider the effects of "creative" versus "negative"
judicial review. His opinion arguably left much "new" in its wake,
and left a nation trembling as a consequence of his creative work.
For example, on March 5, 1857, the day before the release of the
Dred Scott decision, the Constitution said precisely nothing about
the citizenship status of African-origin individuals, "slave" or free,
living in the United States." 4 By the very next day, all African-origin
persons were divested of any and all privileges of citizenship what-
soever, rendering them civil "phantoms" in the American landscape.
In the early morning of March 6, 1857, the constitutional status of
the "slave" was as it always had been - murky at best, and highly
contested. By that evening, the "slave" was rendered property at
law, distinctly and expressly so by application of the Constitution
itself. 16
109. See supra note 23, at 404ff. Chief Justice Taney noted:
[T]hey are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word "citi-
zens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges
which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On
the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or
not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such
as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.
Id. at 404-05.
110. Id. at 451.
111. Id. at 432-49.
112. Id. at 450.
113. Id. at 452.
114. Indeed, in Williams v. Ash, 42 U.S. (1 Howard) 1 (1843), Chief Justice Roger
Taney presiding, the Court heard arguments on behalf of a "slave," for freedom from a
"master" who had allegedly violated a bequest by which he had taken possession of that per-
son. Apparently brought to the Court on the strength of diversity jurisdiction, the "slave"
being an original resident of Maryland and the delinquent "master" residing in Tennessee, the
Court heard the case without qualm, finding on behalf of the plaintiff by granting freedom.
115. And this in the face of the contravening words of James Madison himself, on the
very floor of the Constitutional Convention, when he gave clear support for his (successful)
insistence that the word "slave" not appear in the document itself: "Mr. MADISON thought it
wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men." 1787
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Similarly, on March 5, 1857, Congress maintained control over
the territories, including control over the issue of territorial slavery.
By nightfall that power was obliterated - not by thoughtful action
of the people but by "edict" of the Court - and every square inch
of U.S. Territory was "slave" territory, the contrary desires of the
very territorial residents themselves notwithstanding. 1 6 Indeed, fol-
lowing from the suggested notion of constitutional orthodoxy pro-
posed earlier, the only "negative" thing accomplished by Dred Scott
was the negation of the 1820 Missouri Compromise, an act that
Congress had in fact repealed three years prior to the Dred Scott
ruling.1
1 7
The consequences of "creative" judicial review in the wake of
Dred Scott might reasonably be described as astounding. Politically,
the effects of the decision could not have been more disruptive to
the nation. The Democratic Party was split literally in two as a
result of the decision," 8 and the fledgling Republican Party drove
DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTrrUTION, 2 VOLUMES 956 (Wilboum E. Benton ed., 1986). Madison was
equally clear in the ratification period, noting in Federalist 54 (an essay easily available to
Chief Justice Taney at the time he wrote Dred Scott), "But we must deny the fact that slaves
are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons." THE FEDERALIST
No. 54 (James Madison), supra note 63, at 197. "[Mr. Madison] conced[ed] that the slave was
a moral person, not a mere article of property ... ." RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE
CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND THE CONSTTUTION 106 (1985).
The ruling ran afoul even of early pronouncements of the Court itself, particularly its rul-
ing under Chief Justice John Marshall in Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 150 (1829).
There the plaintiff brought an action for the value of cargo lost in the nature of "slaves"
drowned in passage due to the alleged negligence of defendant. The Court refused to apply
the standard of "negligence" to the matter but rather "gross negligence," as "[tihe doctrine of
common carrier did not apply to the case of carrying intelligent beings, such as negroes." Id.
at 153. Chief Justice Marshall went on to note "In the nature of things, and in his character
... [the slave] resembles a passenger, not a package of goods. It would seem reasonable,
therefore, that the responsibility of a carrier should be measured by the law which applies to
passengers, rather than by that which is applicable to the carriage of common goods." Id. at
155.
116. Indeed Mr. Taney's ruling arguably had the same effect in the states, transforming
every state into a "slave" state. If U.S. CONST. amend. V protected a person's slave property in
a territory, why would it not have a similar effect in a state, even a "free state?" At least one
farmer entering the free state of Iowa believed that very thing, according to a small town
newspaper in Kenosha, Wisconsin (reprinting a note from the FAIRFIELD (IOWA) LEDGER): "The
Fairfield Ledger is informed in good authority, that a Missouri slaveholder has removed to
Warren County, in that State, and brought with him five or six slaves whom he claims a right
to keep and work on the free soil of Iowa, under the Dred Scott decision." KENOSHA TRIBUNE
AND TELEGRAPH, Dec. 3, 1857, at 2. The short editorial statement that followed said much
about the post-Dred Scott state of the nation: "Iowa owes it to herself to strike the manacles
from every slave, brought within her limits, by explicit and peremptory statute." Id.
117. This repeal was an integral part of the Kansas/Nebraska compromise (1854).
118. Following leading Democratic Presidential hopeful Stephen Douglas' refusal to
accede to Southern Democratic demands to incorporate "Dred Scott" language regarding ter-
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through the breach behind its nationally obscure candidate, Abra-
ham Lincoln, to the executive office in 1860. But beyond its
remarkable political effects, Mr. Justice Taney's "creative" review
had revolutionary effects on the Constitution itself, essentially
"denaturalizing" the original 1787 version and leaving a very differ-
ent document in its place - one that anti-slavery interests could
not live with, and one that pro-slavery interests would die for. The
creative mischief of the Court in Dred Scott was eventually cor-
rected by constitutional amendment - three such amendments, in
fact" 9 - when "the people" had their Lockean say about the kind
of document by which the civil society that they had created would
be directed. But not before the very right of "the people" to the
constitution of their choice was settled apart from either politics or
law by "the grim logic of marching men."120
B. Roe v. Wade
The similarities between Dred Scott and the ensuing action of the
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade some one hundred sixteen years
later are remarkable. Both cases derived from a vital question
about fundamental human rights with passionate adherents on both
sides of the central issue, and a broad, interested, undecided major-
ity holding the fiercely contested middle ground. Both cases arrived
at their Courts as a matter of last resort, the respective political
processes having actually or apparently failed to bring satisfactory
closure to the vexing issues before the nation. In attempting to
ritorial slavery directly into the Democratic party platform (Douglas maintained a preference
for the compromise political position of "popular sovereignty" on the matter, constitutionally
surviving Dred Scott by application of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 539 (1842),
in Douglas' mind at least), Southern delegates left the Charleston, S.C., Convention floor,
many uniting behind pro-Dred Scott Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky.
Eric Foner and Olivia Mahoney put the matter thusly:
It was a logical consequence of the Dred Scott decision . . . [Southern politicians]
insisted, that if a territory failed to protect slave property Congress had an obligation
to do so .... [Flor the South to insist on it would guarantee the destruction of the
Democratic party as a national institution.
ERIC FONER AND OLIVIA MAHONEY, A HOUSE DMDED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF LINCOLN 64 (1990).
The party remained splintered through the election, to the benefit of the six-year-old Republi-
can party and its anti-territorial slavery/anti-Dred Scott stance. For an excellent rendering of
the proceedings of the Democratic Convention itself leading up to the momentous party split
in 1860, see WILLnAM B. HESSELTINE, THREE AGAINST LINCOLN: MURAT HALSTEAD REPORTS THE
CAUCUSES OF 1860 (1960).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolition of slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (citizenship
for African-origin persons); and U.S. CONST. amend. XV (suffrage rights for African-origin per-
sons).
120. R. KENT NEWMEYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 139 (1986).
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"settle" the questions before the respective Courts, both eschewed
available judicial compromises in favor of firm, straightforward
decisions in which one side was undeniably preferred as "winner,"
and this by identical judicial majorities, 7-2. And in both cases,
despite their individual mandates and clearly expressed desires to
the contrary, the turbulent events following their releases undenia-
bly demonstrated that they effectively settled nothing.'2 '
Accepting appellant's challenge to a Texas statute "substantially
unchanged" from the original nineteenth century legislative act
criminalizing abortion in that State, 122 Mr. Justice Blackmun's "Opin-
ion of the Court"'' wasted no time in setting out its own particular
view of the task before it. This view would govern the way it con-
ceived of the problem and tailored the result: "Our task, of course,
is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emo-
tion and of predilection."'24 The Court began by setting out the
broad constitutional arena within which the contest should be con-
ducted: "[O]n behalf of herself and all other women 'similar situ-
ated' ", appellant Roe "claimed that the Texas statutes were uncon-
stitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal
privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments."125 Thereafter, the Court set about its "settling" task
in earnest, finding first that "[t]his right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the Dis-
trict Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."'
26
Turning to the matter of the place of the fetus in the mix of
121. In addition, some would argue that the cases were not dissimilar in result, Dred
Scott setting off the most horrific war in the nation's history, and Roe commencing a "war"
of its own, less spectacular but no less deadly, with casualties numbering in the tens of mil-
lions, to borrow from the polemical views of one side in the tortured debate. Dred Scott's
war lasted four awful years. Following the problematic analogy to its logical conclusion,
Roe's "war," lately (and tragically) adding living, sentient human beings to its "casualty list,"
rages on.
122. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Add irony to the things con-
necting Dred Scott and Roe - the Texas originating statute was passed in the same year
Dred Scott was decided, 1857.
123. The opinion was concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, 'and Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell. Justices Rehnquist and White dissented.
124. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added). This "settling" matter will be further
explored herein.
125. Id. at 120.
126. Id. at 153.
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"rights bearing" entities, the Court was equally sure that "[a]ll this
[prior reasoning] . . . together with our observation, supra, that
throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal
abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us
that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn .... "121 Mixing in its earlier determination
of the existence of "important state interests in regulation [of abor-
tion at some level]," 128 the Court was ready to present its novel
"settlement" of the issue: (1.) the woman (and physician) owned
exclusive rights to the abortion decision in the first trimester of
pregnancy; 129 (2.) in the second trimester the State gained the right
to "regulate the abortion procedure to the extent the regulation rea-
sonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health";'3° and (3.) the State could regulate abortion to the level of
prohibiting it altogether "at viability"13' (roughly at the beginning of
the third trimester) by demonstrating "important and legitimate
interest in potential life."
32
In keeping with the thesis of this study, it can easily be seen that
there is much "creative" in the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade, with attendant complications. To begin with, there is
the matter of the Court's self-accepted role of "settling" the difficult
national dilemma. Apart from the daunting nature implicit in such a
task,'33 and imputing no ill motives to the accepting Court, its own
sense of its responsibilities in matters such as are presented in
Dred Scott and Roe is quite simply wrong in any reasonable sense
of American constitutional orthodoxy. The Court cannot be charged
with "settling" such matters but rather with discovering how the
Constitution would have them settled, if at all. The Constitution is
not that of the Justices' subjective understandings, or even those of
127. Id. at 158.
128. Id. at 154.




133. Significant within the community of those sharing academic interest in the
Supreme Court is the subset of scholars who believe some questions to be inherently "too
hot" for that institution to handle. According to these scholars, the better thing, for itself and
for the nation, is for the Court to effectively "pass" on such questions, trusting them to the
political institutions. Don Fehrenbacher states the matter plainly on behalf of that subset,
noting: "[A]lthough judges did do much of the work of drawing the line between State and
national authority, some controversies were too crucial and/or too aggravated to be resolved
in any courtroom." CONsTInUTONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDNG SouTH 38 (1989).
The present author is determinedly not a member of that thoughtful camp.
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the Founders,13 but instead that of the original ratifiers of the
charter, those "people" who voluntarily left the "state of nature"
and set the metes and bounds of government years ago. If the
Court can find no whisper of a position among the original ratifiers
on such a question, Lockean orthodoxy would require it to high-
light that reality and let the matter be. By definition such issues are
quintessentially political, belonging of right to the "polity" for satis-
factory settlement, either by petit acts (legislation) or grands (Con-
stitutional amendments), in the creative arena of political govern-
ment. To move deliberately beyond these bounds is to wholly
embrace what has been denominated here "creative constitutional-
ism," reshaping the reach of the document by unorthodox means -
indeed outside the singular creative power of the "people" them-
selves - with naturally following negative results.
135
Beyond even the creative notion of "settlement" itself, it is unde-
niable that the Supreme Court left a very different world in its
wake after the completion of the majority opinion in Roe. To begin
with, the Court further entrenched the "right of privacy" within the
penumbral confines of the Constitution, though admittedly (of
necessity) between its lines, 136 unilaterally extending that right
beyond any reasonable apprehension of what the ratifying people
134. James Madison himself fully understood and anticipated the jurisprudential fallacy
of "original intentism" in looking to the "the Founders" for ultimate meaning in the Constitu-
tion, noting directly that:
[I]f a key to the meaning of the Constitution was to be "sought elsewhere" than in the
text itself, it must not be in the opinion or intentions of the body which planned and
proposed the Constitution, but in the sense attached to it by the people in their
respective State Conventions where it received all the authority which it pos-
sesses ....
CHARLES WARREN, supra note 49, at 67-68. Madison elaborated further on the important point,
in no less certain terms, noting that, "as presumptive evidence of the general understanding,
at the time, of the language used [in the Constitution], it must be kept in mind that the only
authoritative intentions were those of the people of the States as expressed through the Con-
ventions which ratified the Constitution." Id. at 68.
135. Though the scope of this study does not allow a definitive statement on the issue,
the immediate and strong negative reactions from a significant portion of the interested pub-
lic following both Dred Scott and Roe at least implicates some level of visceral response to
the co-opting of constitutional process on the part of the Supreme Court, in the highly con-
tentious area of fundamental "human rights" at least. Indeed, with regard to Dred Scott, a
selective review of local presses over the period of time from its release through the 1860
election all but establishes this to have been the case. See Anthony V. Baker, "The Authors of
All Our Troubles": The Press, the Supreme Court and the Civil War, 8 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTH-
ERN LEGAL HISTORY 29 (2000).
136. The Court was not coy about this, candidly noting: "The Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy." See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
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might have envisioned for the constituting document. 137 In addition,
the Court appended a versatility to that privacy right unheard of
prior to Roe, causing it to balance precariously between the com-
peting interests of the pregnant woman, the fetus and the state,
both collapsing and expanding simultaneously.138 Further, the role
of the state in the matter of abortion was dramatically and unilater-
ally recreated by the Court, its legitimate reach being redrawn
short of the pregnant woman and the fetus she carried, by virtue of
the effectively expanding Constitution. And, of course, while the
fetus occupied a doubtful place in the rights pantheon of the Con-
stitution immediately prior to Roe, it dropped entirely out of con-
sideration (or protection) in that regard by virtue of the work of
the Court in that case.
139
As with Dred Scott before it, the catalytic effects of Roe v. Wade
on the nature of the abortion debate, and on constitutionalism
more broadly, are all but undeniable. What was (prior to Roe) and
remains in essence a "political issue," implicating the entire polity
and deserving of reasoned debate in the public forum, has been
effectively removed from that venue and transferred to the much
more dramatic arena of "supreme law" under the Constitution.
Relationships between the interested parties in the debate changed
as well following Roe, from focused political opponents to strident
Constitutional foes, without effective process to mediate their hon-
estly held differences.1 40 Relationships of the opposing parties to
137. Whether one considers the late eighteenth century ratifiers, responsible for the
"First, Fourth, Fifth, [and/or] Ninth [Amendments]" (See supra note 120) or their post-1860
counterparts responsible for the "Fourteenth Amendment" (see supra note 120), the result is
exactly the same. Indeed, with regard to application of the Fourteenth Amendment, by the
Court's own admission, through its laboriously traced history in Roe, ratification of that
amendment occurred roughly contemporaneously with the national sweep toward incrimina-
tion of abortion. To read an extension of privacy to abortion in this regard would appear to
be indelicate at best.
138. Here, of course, the author refers to the unique counter-switch in privacy interests
between the pregnant woman and the state over the life of the pregnancy, the one shrinking
even as the other expands, the fetus benefiting from this fluid state of protection each day
that it "survives."
139. This is so at least until the point of "viability" as defined by the Court, when the
state regains legitimate constitutional power to act of its own accord on behalf of the fetus.
It is highly doubtful that the notion of "viability" was in any way a part of the considerations
of those persons called on to memorialize rights within the supreme law of their land, either
in the late 1780s, when the Bill of Rights was insisted upon by the polity, or in 1868, at the
passage of Amendment XIV.
140. This latter consequence - the destruction of an effective mediation process -
should not be underplayed. As long as the debate stayed in the political arena, it remained
amenable (arguably) to the comparatively more streamlined and manipulable political pro-
cess, seeking to fashion a creative and sensitive solution to the problem. Following Roe's cre-
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law were suddenly thrown out of kilter as well, rendering each of
them in an opposite role in relation to both criminal and constitu-
tional law following Roe.141 In short, much as its predecessor body
in Dred Scott, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade worked changes
in America, palpable changes affecting both "the people" and their
fundamental law. In the context of this article's thesis, this asser-
tion is by no means unimportant.
V. CONCLUSION: RE-REVIEWING JUDICIAL REVIEW
When the men traveled to Philadelphia from their various vil-
lages, hamlets, homesteads and cities in the summer of 1787 to
consider the vagaries and details of pure government, they did so
under the most difficult of circumstances. Clearly, they approached
their daunting task in a crucible of singular and pristine pressures,
from within and from without, that only served to more dramati-
cally highlight the impossibility of what they had determined to do.
Domestically, the motley thirteen member collection of hostile
fiefdoms comprising the United States under the Articles of Confed-
eration 42 showed undeniable evidences of fissure portending immi-
nent and spectacular disintegration before 1790, short of some dra-
matic and powerfully redemptive change.143 Worse, England gave
hints of an intention to recommence a war temporarily halted by
the 1783 Treaty of Paris, with a fledgling nation effectively incapa-
ative constitutionalization of the issue, however, the more streamlined process has necessa-
rily given way entirely to the much more unwieldy and intractable processes related to
constitutional change - changing (or protecting) the Court, or the Constitution itself. In
addition, with that change has come an undeniable transformation in the parties' relationship
to one another, infusing a stridency and desperation not present in the same degree prior to
Roe, and of continuing incendiary effect today.
141. While the ultimate effect of this legal transmogrification - changing parties to
opposite sides in relation to both criminal and constitutional law - cannot be precisely
determined within the scope of this work, it can reasonably be speculated upon as great.
142. "Thirteen Sovereignties pulling against each other" peerless Revolutionary War
General George Washington lamented in private correspondence to James Madison, Novem-
ber 5, 1786, which would, without intervention of "a liberal, and energetic Constitution" have
the untoward effect of bringing "ruin on the whole." Letter from George Washington to
James Madison (November 5, 1786), in 29 THE WRrINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-1799, 52 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
143. Included among the crises wracking domestic America by the mid-1780s was ram-
pant, uncontrollable post-War inflation, economic protectionism in the form of exorbitant
interstate currency exchange rates (mediating such varying circulation currencies as the moi-
dores, dubloons, pistoles, gold johannesses, english and french crowns, pounds sterling and
spanish milled "dollars" or, more colloquially, "pieces of eight"), and violent tax revolts
across the Massachusetts countryside throughout late 1786 and into the early months of
1787, such as the one popularly led by Revolutionary War Patriot Daniel Shays, with the real
threat of others in its wake.
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ble of raising a national militia as a result of the weakness of its
own constituting document.144 Evidences of the urgency attending
the proposed Convention of 1787 are rife within the private writ-
ings of many of the patriots calling for immediate and virile
national action in the face of the panoply of post-Articles horribles
facing them.
45
The difficult conditions under which the singular work of 1787
was contemplated underscore the scope of what was accomplished
in Philadelphia that summer. None of the men destined for civil
beatification as "Founding Fathers" as a result of their collective
work were fully satisfied with the final result of their marathon
hours of debate and compromise.146 Indeed, only thirty-nine of the
fifty-five men participating in the 1787 debates were signatories to
the final document. The objecting sixteen included such notable
names as Revolutionary War patriot George Mason of Virginia and
renowned Massachusetts politician Elbridge Gerry. Nevertheless,
the draft outlining a wholly unique edifice of republican-democratic
government was presented before "the people" represented in spe-
cially convened state assemblies across the eastern seaboard for
consideration and final vote. And as the decisions of those assem-
blies trickled in across the nation throughout late 1787 and into
1788, first from Delaware, 147 and, in rapid succession thereafter,
144. Chief among the many pungent criticisms of the Articles of Confederation circulat-
ing within pre-Constitution America was its "enabling" language with regard to a national
defense militia. Under ART. 9 thereof (para.5), Congress was empowered to "agree upon the
number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion
to the number of white inhabitants in such State; which requisitions shall be binding," but in
no way enforceable by the national government on the States, and thus wholly advisory (and
regularly ignored). England was very interested in this telling disability of government.
145. Most interesting in this regard are private correspondences involving General
Washington to John Jay (August 1, 1786), see supra note 142, Volume 28, 501-04; to Henry
Lee (October 31, 1786), see supra note 142, at 33-35; and to James Madison (November 5,
1786) see supra note 142, at 50-52. In them General Washington both agreed with the neces-
sity of and actively advanced calls for the establishment of a centralization of power in a
proposed national government sufficient to meet the disabilities facing the nation. In light of
the then active government under the Articles of Confederation, General Washington's pro-
nouncements were arguably, and ironically, within the bounds of treason.
146. See Edward P. Smith, The Movement Toward a Second Constitutional Convention
1788, in ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD
1775-1789, 49, 50 (J. Franklin Jameson ed., 1970), in which the author states the matter
plainly: "As it came from the hands of its framers... [the draft Constitution] completely sat-
isfied none of them." Indeed, in signing the document he was so pivotal in creating, Alexan-
der Hamilton was reported to have remarked, ruefully, "No man's ideas are more remote
from the [final] plan than mine are known to be." Id. at 50.
147. December 7, 1787, unanimously.
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from Pennsylvania,' 48 New Jersey,4 9 Georgia,W° Connecticut,' 5' Mas-
sachusetts, 52 Maryland,'3 South Carolina,'5 and, momentously,
from New Hampshire,1 5s the improbable experiment in popular sov-
ereignty was fully initiated.
Had he been alive, John Locke would heartily have commended
these remarkable machinations of political thought and government
creation in "the colonies" at the end of the eighteenth century.
After all, how many political philosophers have the opportunity of
seeing their intricate theories of government spring suddenly to life
before a watching, and very probably wondering, world? Moreover,
he would have implicitly understood the importance of an ordered
and organized process of dispute resolution regarding any contro-
versy about the constituting document. Such controversy would
involve the very boundaries of power - that power delegated by
"the people" to their self-created and directed government, and that
power jealously retained to themselves - and would thus be of
paramount concern to the constituted republic. And he would have
coldly comprehended one other thing of note - namely, the power
inuring to the institution owning that responsibility.
The "Founding Fathers" similarly anticipated the need for media-
tion power within the very framework of the government they were
busy creating in 1787. They had the benefit of a rich if not large
collection of guiding precedents, in the form of state actions of
judiciaries reviewing and negating acts of state legislatures deemed
in contravention of overarching, fundamental law. They carried that
understanding into the 1787 Convention, with Madison's remarkable
recording of those debates belying rudimentary understanding of
judicial review throughout. The matter of judicial negative received
precise and intense debate by both Federalist and Anti-Federalist
148. December 13, 1787, 46 delegates favoring and 23 delegates dissenting.
149. Unanimously.
150. Unanimously.
151. 128 favoring, 40 dissenting.
152. February 6, 1788, 187 delegates favoring and 168 delegates dissenting.
153. 63 favoring, 11 dissenting.
154. 149 favoring, 73 dissenting.
155. New Hampshire provided the ninth ratifying assembly, June 21, 1788, by a vote of
57-47, thus fulfilling the threshold of nine states necessary to engage the Constitution and
commence the new nation under it. Results followed thereafter from Virginia, June 25, 1788,
by an 89-79 vote, and New York, July 26, 1788, by an even closer vote, 30-27. The remaining
recalcitrant states would enter the Union after the sitting of the inaugural Congress, North
Carolina, reluctantly, on November 19, 1789, by a 194-77 vote, and Rhode Island, almost defi-
antly, under articulated threat of economic embargo by the other twelve states, by a two-
vote margin, 34-32.
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apologists throughout the stormy ratification period. Thus, particu-
larly in the wake of the Alien and Sedition Acts controversy, by
the turn of the eighteenth/nineteenth centuries, notions of Supreme
Court judicial review of acts of the Federal Legislature were rou-
tinely a part of national public discourse, and almost entirely with-
out controversy.
Thus, when Chief Justice Marshall completed his total reserva-
tion of the constitutional negative to his branch of the tri-partite
federal government in 1803, his actions could not reasonably have
been viewed as unanticipated by his contemporaries, or even par-
ticularly controversial. Indeed, the Chief Justice himself did not
even necessarily consider the power he deliberately garnered to his
Court to have been the final word on the matter. Speaking privately
less than one year after his important pronouncement in Marbury,
the Chief Justice admitted that "[a] reversal of those legal opinions
[of the Supreme Court] deemed unsound by the legislature would
certainly better comport with American institutions and character"
than the process of impeachment then being contemplated and
threatened by Jeffersonian Republicans.15 More importantly, it
appears clear from his historic opinion that the Chief Justice envi-
sioned the power inuring to the Court from his words to exist
entirely in the negative. This, too, was not controversial, squaring
completely with the common sense jurisprudential notions of John
Locke, and the more clearly described limits of the power articu-
lated plainly by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78.
Which leaves the not insignificant matter of what I have dubbed
here as "creative" judicial review. Clearly such a variation of the
necessary policing power finds no jurisprudential support in the
subtleties of Lockean thought; indeed, it could not. Moreover, it
appears to have no support in the articulations of the "Founders"
and their contemporaries. Indeed, such a formulation of judicial
review would appear to be counter-majoritarian and anti-republican
in the purest form in which those criticisms can be imagined. Yet
the power must undeniably be seen to exist, potently and danger-
ously so, if the above treatments of Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade are
accurate in any reasonable degree.
Discussions regarding "power" in relation to the Supreme Court
are by no means new, of course. However, where the matter of
"judicial review" is concerned, they have almost exclusively been
mandated in the crucible of partisan, polemical argument, obscur-
156. KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 24, at 231.
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ing some of the subtle and important nuances lying beneath the
polemics. This exploration is by no means benign and inconsequen-
tial given the centrality and importance of the matters at its heart.
For this reason, and others even more timely and more directly at
issue,157 it simply can not be ignored. The academy is uniquely qual-
ified to conduct the kind of debate that the matters raised herein
would seem to call for, and to do so in the kind of constructive
atmosphere that the importance of the issues all but demands. In
light of that importance, framed by issues raised in this article, and
with an appropriate spirit of modesty, I would invite the discus-
sions to begin again.
157. Note, in this regard, the recent work of the Supreme Court in Dickerson v. United
States. There, the Court reviewed the decision of the 4
th Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4"' Cir. 1999), upholding the constitutionality and the appli-
cability of § 3501 to voluntary criminal confessions given in "technical violation" of the warn-
ings otherwise mandated by Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion of the Court in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), allowing the admission into evidence of such
confessions in spite of the Miranda limitations. In essence, the Court elaborated on the tim-
bre of its own voice, as it were, determining the effect of Congress' deliberate legislative
attempt to limit the Court's creative constitutionality in Miranda, deciding, in the end,
whether that voice is indeed ex cathedra and final. While almost all attention focused on the
fate of Miranda therein, the case nevertheless implicated and potentially defined a rare,
important, Marbury-like moment, one which effectively heightened the urgency of the thesis
and discussion of this paper, it would seem.
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